Why the United States and the Soviet Union, clearly on a path to develop and produce a serviceable nuclear powered air platform; decided to terminate their respective programs? If the technology was there, what was missing? As with any program involving a military project, there political and social forces driving it in reverse directions. These same forces that drove the U.S. and U.S.S.R. into investing so many resources were the same ones that drove their programs to a halt. The nuclear power aircraft program of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. started in a time when atomic energy was view as a “do it all” energy source. But here is where the similarities ended. From the late 1940s to the early 1960s, atomic power was view very favorable by the general population in the United States. Atomic energy was being use to supply electricity to cities and small towns across the country. The U.S. military rapidly responded to this new found energy source with its own research and development programs. Beside the ordinance harness of the atom, such as in bombs or missiles; nuclear propulsion was an intriguing subject among military leaders. The U.S. Navy began to experiment with nuclear reactors aboard vessels, specially, aircraft carriers; with the purpose of generating an unlimited source of steam to drive them. Submarine use of nuclear propulsion was also researched and vigorously tested during this period. Seen their main competitor for funds implementing nuclear propulsion programs, the newly formed United States Air Force decided to join the fray. Immediately, the Air Force recognized the strategic bomber as the platform that would argument its operational profile if it were nuclear powered. Aircrafts do not have the capacity to carry enough fuel to achieve maximum operational capability. For long distance flights or combat patrols, bombers usually needed to make more than one re-fueling stop. Subtracting time from the mission profile. A nuclear powered aircraft could solve this problem. As stated in the articles before, studies had demonstrated that the U.S. possessed the technical ability to produce a workable nuclear powered bomber. Here is where the political aspect of the equation enters. Through its history, the nuclear powered aircraft program was plagued by a lack of short term vision and political interfering. The Air Force, who was tasked the oversight of the program by the Department of Defense, almost immediately failed to set short-term, achievable goals for the program. Major shifts in the program’s objectives were made with relative frequency. Causing the program managers to shift resources from one aspect of the program to another. This lead directly to wasting of valuable time and financial resources. One example was the construction of massive test facilities for the program at great expenses, only to be demolished after they were never use. In March of 1953, the program was place on termination phase by then Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson due to a lack of progress. However, the Soviet successful lunch of Sputnik changed all of this. Sputnik did more than start the space race; it brought back to center stage the nuclear technological race between the superpowers. Congressmen were flowing letters to the Eisenhower Administration to re-invest in the nuclear powered bomber program at once. Vigorous lobbying on behalf of the Air Force created an increase in available funds for the program. At this moment, and adding to the public sentiment of fear; reports began to surface about an experimental Soviet nuclear powered bomber flying test runs near the Polish border. The net effect on the program was an influx of funds and human resources. A new life, albeit, a short one.